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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
 Ezequiel Adan Campos appeals from the district court’s order summarily dismissing his 
post-conviction petition.  
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 
 Campos, a convicted felon, pulled a gun on an individual who honked his car horn at him 
while Campos was stopped at a stop sign.  (See R., pp.138-139.)  Campos fired a shot from the 
gun when the victim attempted to follow him to view his license plate.  (See id.)  The state 
charged Campos with aggravated assault, unlawful possession of a weapon, and sentencing 
enhancements for use of a deadly weapon in commission of a crime and for being a persistent 
violator.  (See Mycourts.idaho.gov portal, Campos v. State, Ada County District Court Case No. 
CR-FE-2015-3547; R., p.105.)  Pursuant to a plea agreement with the state, Campos pled guilty 
to the weapon possession charge.  (R., pp.133-136.1)  The state agreed to dismiss the other 
charge and the sentencing enhancements.  (R., p.133.)  Sentencing was left “open to argument.”  
(Id.)  Prior to this resolution of the Ada County case, Campos had pled guilty and was sentenced 
for drug trafficking and possession charges in Canyon County.  (See R., pp.133, 138.) 
 At the sentencing hearing in the Ada County case, the state recommended that the district 
court impose Campos’ sentence for unlawful possession of a weapon consecutive to Campos’ 
Canyon County sentences.  (R., p.138.)  The district court imposed a unified five-year sentence 
with four years fixed and ran the sentence consecutive as recommended by the state.  (R., p.139.)   
                                            
1 The transcript from Campos’ change of plea hearing, which was submitted as an exhibit in the 
post-conviction proceeding, had several pages missing.  (See R., pp.99-103; Tr., p.22, L.3 – p.24, 
L.10.)  The state submitted a replacement exhibit with all pages the next day.  (R., pp.133-137.) 
2 
 
The court denied Campos’ subsequent I.C.R. 35 motion.  (See R., p.114.)  Campos did not file a 
direct appeal.  (See R., pp.76, 114-115.) 
 In March 2017, Campos filed a pro se post-conviction petition raising numerous 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims.  (R., pp.5-26.)  Relevant to this appeal, Campos 
appeared to assert that his trial counsel led him to believe that he would receive a concurrently-
imposed sentence, and advised him to simply answer in the affirmative in his responses to the 
district court’s questions during the plea colloquy.  (R., pp.10-24.)  The district court appointed 
counsel to represent Campos in the post-conviction proceeding.  (R., p.63.)  However, appointed 
counsel chose not to amend the petition.  (See R., p.76.)   
The state moved for summary dismissal of the petition.  (R., pp.75-88.)  The state argued 
that Campos’ claim related to the consecutively-imposed sentence was disproven by the record.  
(R., pp.81-83.)  Specifically, the state noted that the plea advisory form, change of plea hearing 
transcript, and sentencing hearing transcript indicated that the plea agreement did not include any 
provisions regarding the sentence, and that Campos understood that the district court could 
impose any lawful sentence, including a consecutively-imposed sentence.  (R., pp.81-83.)  After 
a hearing on the state’s motion, the district court summarily dismissed Campos’ petition on the 
same grounds as set forth by the state.  (R., pp.143-144; Tr., p.24, L.18 – p.29, L.15.)   Campos 













Campos states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Campos’ claim that 
his guilty plea was coerced by his attorney’s misrepresentation of the plea 
agreement and false promises to correct errors in the terms of the argument [sic] 
at a later date because the claim presents a genuine issue of material fact?  
(Appellant’s brief, p. 7.) 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Campos failed to demonstrate that the district court erred by summarily dismissing 
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Campos contends that the district court erred by summarily dismissing his post-
conviction petition.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.8-13.)  Specifically, Campos assigns error to the 
court’s dismissal of his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for providing inaccurate 
advice regarding his sentence and/or lying to or misleading him about the plea agreement and/or 
failing to object to the court’s imposition of the consecutively-imposed sentence.  (Id.)  Campos 
has failed to demonstrate that the district court erred because his relevant factual allegations are 
disproven by his previous sworn statements made at his change of plea hearing, and by other 
evidence in the record.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
“On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary 
hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists based on the 
pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file.”  Workman v. State, 
144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007). 
 
C. The District Court Correctly Concluded That Campos Failed To Make A Prima Facie 
Showing For Post-Conviction Relief With Respect To His Ineffective Assistance Of Trial 
Counsel Claim Regarding The Consecutively-Imposed Sentence 
 
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure 
Act.  I.C. § 19-4901, et seq.  A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a new and independent 
civil proceeding in which the petitioner bears the burden of establishing that he is entitled to 
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relief.  Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802; State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 
P.2d 548, 550 (1983).    
 Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for post-
conviction relief, in response to a party’s motion or on the court’s own initiative, if the applicant 
“has not presented evidence making a prima facie case as to each essential element of the claims 
upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof.”  Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 518, 960 P.2d 
738, 739 (1998).  Until controverted by the state, allegations in a verified post-conviction 
application are, for purposes of determining whether to hold an evidentiary hearing, deemed true.  
Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542, 545, 531 P.2d 1187, 1190 (1975).  However, the court is not 
required to accept either the applicant’s mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible 
evidence, or the applicant’s conclusions of law.  Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 
112 (2001); Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994).  Further, 
allegations contained in a post-conviction petition are insufficient for granting relief when they 
are clearly disproved by the record of the original proceeding or do not justify relief as a matter 
of law.  Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802; Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 903, 
174 P.3d 870, 873 (2007).    
A post-conviction petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate 
both deficient performance and resulting prejudice.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
687-88 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989).  Bare 
assertions and speculation, unsupported by specific facts, do not make out a prima facie case for 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  Roman, 125 Idaho at 649, 873 P.2d at 903.  An attorney’s 
performance is not constitutionally deficient unless it falls below an objective standard of 
reasonableness, and there is a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct is within the wide range 
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of reasonable professional assistance.  Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631, 634, 718 P.2d 283, 286 
(1986); Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989).  To establish 
prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient 
performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.  Aragon v. State, 114 
Idaho 758, 761, 760 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1988); Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 685, 978 P.2d 
241, 245 (Ct. App. 1999).     
 The claim in Campos’ post-conviction petition related to the consecutively-imposed 
sentence is somewhat difficult to decipher.  The petition does not specify enumerated claims, but 
instead consists primarily of a lengthy narrative.  (R., pp.7-25.)  In the petition, it is clear that 
Campos asserts: (1) that he believed he would receive a concurrently imposed sentence; and (2) 
that his trial counsel advised him to answer in the affirmative in his responses to the district 
court’s questions during the plea colloquy.  (Id.)  However, it is unclear whether Campos asserted 
that his counsel was ineffective for: failing to object to the imposition of the consecutive 
sentence on the ground that the plea agreement bound the district court to impose a concurrent 
sentence; lying to or misleading Campos about what terms the plea agreement contained or did 
not contain; lying to or misleading Campos about his intention to challenge the sentencing issue 
in a subsequent I.C.R. 35 motion; and/or inaccurately advising Campos that the district court 
would impose a concurrent sentence.  (See id.)  Further, while Campos asserted in his subsequent 
memorandum that there was a reasonable probability that he would have rejected the plea 
agreement had he realized that there was a possibility that his sentence would be imposed 
consecutively (R., p.125), he did not make any specific factual assertions to this effect in his 
petition (see R., pp.10-24).   
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 In its brief in support of its motion for summary dismissal, the state construed Campos’ 
claim as asserting that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to “correct an omission on the 
guilty plea advisory form at the sentencing hearing” by “advis[ing] the court…at the sentencing 
hearing that he was expecting a sentence concurrent to his Canyon County case.”  (R., pp.81-83.)  
The state argued that this claim should be summarily dismissed because Campos failed to present 
admissible facts that the plea agreement between himself and the state included a term that the 
sentence was to run concurrently (or that either party was required to make a recommendation to 
that effect).  (Id.)  To the extent that this Court construes the claim as the state did, the state 
adopts the argument as presented below.  As discussed in greater detail below, the guilty plea 
advisory form signed by Campos, the discussion between the parties and court at the change of 
plea hearing, and Campos’ sworn statements made during the plea colloquy affirmatively 
demonstrate that the plea agreement did not include any provision related to the court’s 
sentencing determinations.  (R., pp.92, 133-134.)  Campos did not present any evidence to the 
contrary.    
 At the hearing on the state’s motion for summary dismissal, the district court expressed 
some confusion about the nature of the claim.  (Tr., p.10, p.1 – p.14, L.4.)  Campos’ post-
conviction counsel attempted to clarify the claim and informed the court that Campos was 
asserting that trial counsel lied to him in some unspecified manner about the plea agreement, and 
that this rendered Campos’ plea involuntary.  (Id.)  The court appeared to accept this clarification 
and to construe the claim in a manner consistent with this representation.  (Tr., p.14, Ls.2-14.)  
Campos’ counsel acknowledged that these assertions were contrary to statements Campos made 
during the change of plea and sentencing hearings.  (Tr., p.14, Ls.7-20.)  The court ultimately 
concluded that Campos’ factual allegations were both conclusory and contrary to Campos’ sworn 
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statements from the change of plea hearing; and that a post-conviction petitioner does not create 
an issue of material fact simply by contradicting his own prior sworn statements.  (Tr., p.24, L.18 
– p.25, L.11; p.27, Ls.1-8; p.27, L.22 – p.29, L.15.)  The court was correct.     
 Like any other civil litigant attempting to avoid an adverse summary judgment ruling, a 
post-conviction petitioner does not raise a genuine issue of fact by merely contradicting in an 
affidavit what he told the court, under oath, in a plea hearing.  See Frazier v. J.R. Simplot Co., 
136 Idaho 100, 103, 29 P.3d 936, 939 (2001) (citation omitted) (impermissible to attempt to 
prevent an adverse summary judgment ruling by creating factual issues in an affidavit which 
contradict prior sworn deposition statements); Matter of Estate of Keeven, 126 Idaho 290, 298, 
882 P.2d 427, 435 (Ct. App. 1994) (a “sham” affidavit that directly contradicts previous 
testimony may be disregarded on a summary judgment motion).  Because the allegations in 
Campos’ post-conviction petition were affirmatively disproved by his prior sworn statements at 
the change of plea hearing, they did not create a genuine issue of material fact entitling him to an 
evidentiary hearing.  Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (post-conviction allegations 
insufficient for granting of relief when they are clearly disproved by the record); Cootz v. State, 
129 Idaho 360, 368, 924 P.2d 622, 630 (Ct. App. 1996) (same); see also Kennedy v. Allied Mut. 
Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 262, 266 (9th Cir. 1991) (recognizing that allowing parties to raise issues of 
fact simply by submitting an affidavit contradicting prior testimony would greatly diminish the 
utility of summary judgment proceedings).    
 In the guilty plea advisory form signed by Campos, Campos wrote that he understood the 
terms of the plea agreement to include “open sentencing.”  (R., p.92.)  He also initialed the 
section indicating that he understood that the court was not bound by the plea agreement and 




counsel informed the court that, under the terms of the plea agreement, “[s]entencing is open to 
argument.”  (R., p.133.)  After he was placed under oath, Campos indicated that:  (1) he had the 
opportunity to go over the agreement with his attorney; (2) his attorney answered his questions 
and explained matters to his satisfaction; (3) he was satisfied with his attorney’s representation; 
(4) he had no remaining questions about the agreement; (5) nobody made any promises to him 
regarding what the district court’s sentence would be; (6) he understood that the district court 
could impose any sentence up to the maximum for unlawful possession of a firearm; and (7) he 
understood that the district court could impose the sentence consecutive to the sentence imposed 
in Campos’ Canyon County case.  (R., pp.133-136.)  At the sentencing hearing, the court again 
reiterated that the plea agreement did not bind the parties’ sentencing recommendations.  (R., 
p.137.)  Consistent with this agreement, and without objection from Campos’ counsel, the state 
recommended that the district court impose its sentence consecutive to Campos’ Canyon County 
sentence.  (R., p.138.)      
 As the district court properly concluded in this case, Campos’ sworn statements at the 
change of plea hearing disproved the relevant factual allegations in his post-conviction petition.  
Campos’ sworn statements disproved both his allegation that he believed that the district court 
was required to impose a concurrent sentence, and any implied allegation that his trial counsel 
misled or lied to him about the existence of a plea agreement containing a provision that would 
bind the court to impose a concurrent sentence.  Without any corroboration, the district court was 
not required to accept these assertions.     
Finally, even assuming: (1) the truth of Campos’ allegation that his trial counsel advised 
him to answer in the affirmative in his responses to the district court’s questions during the plea 
colloquy; (2) that this allegation was not disproven by the record; and (3) that counsel’s advice 
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constituted Strickland deficient performance, Campos has still failed to allege facts 
demonstrating Strickland prejudice.  As noted above, the record reflects that the district court 
clearly and accurately informed Campos of the scope of its sentencing discretion in this case, and 
that Campos understood the court’s authority in this respect.  The court expressly informed 
Campos that it could impose a consecutive sentence.  (R., p.135.)  Campos still chose to plead 
guilty.  Therefore, Campos has failed to allege facts demonstrating that there would have been a 
different outcome (i.e., that he would have chosen not to take the state’s plea offer), if not for any 
counsel advice regarding Campos’ answers to the court’s questions.  
Campos has failed to demonstrate that the district court erred in concluding that he failed 
to present a prima facie ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim related to the consecutively- 
imposed sentence.  This Court should therefore affirm the district court’s summary dismissal of 




 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s order summarily 
dismissing Campos’ petition for post-conviction relief. 




      /s/ Mark W. Olson 
      MARK W. OLSON 
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